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1 The Thunder of History: The Origins and
Development of the New Fiscal Sociology
isaac william martin, ajay k. mehrotra,
and monica prasad
The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may
prepare – all this and more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases.
He who knows how to listen to its message here discerns the thunder of world
history more clearly than anywhere else.
– Joseph Schumpeter [1918] 1991
Everyone knows that taxation is important. Political scientists know that tax cuts
are a major partisan battleground in the United States today, and that the rise of
neoliberal ideology has propelled taxation onto the international policy agenda.
Legal scholars know that the tax code has become the preferred vehicle for promot-
ing an enormous variety of domestic policies – from social provisions to industrial
policies to educational subsidies. Historians know that taxation has been a pivotal
source of conflict and change from the American Revolution to the Reagan revolu-
tion, and that taxes have been central to the formation of civic identity across place
and time. Sociologists know that nearly every issue with which they are concerned –
the obligations of the individual to society; the powers and legitimacy of the state;
the allocation of public and private resources; the rise of bureaucratic administra-
tion; the reproduction of class, race, and gender inequalities – runs through the
issue of taxation.
There are good reasons why many scholars have recognized the importance of
taxation. Taxes formalize our obligations to each other. They define the inequalities
we accept and those that we collectively seek to redress. They signify who is a
member of our political community, how wide we draw the circle of “we.” They
set the boundaries of what our governments can do. In the modern world, taxation
is the social contract.
Some scholars also know that a new wave of multidisciplinary scholarship on
taxation is poised for a significant intellectual breakthrough. In recent decades,
scholars in economics, sociology, political science, history, and law – among other
disciplines – have begun to recognize the central importance of taxation to moder-
nity, and produce innovative comparative historical scholarship on the sources
We are grateful for comments on this introduction from James Mahoney, Audrey Sacks, and participants
of the Thunder of History conference.
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and consequences of taxation (see, e.g., Steinmo 1993; Howard 1997; Kornhauser
1985, 1990; Avi-Yonah 2000, 2004; Bank 2003; Brownlee 1996; Zelizer 1998;
Lindert 2004; Gould and Baker 2002; Mumford 2002). This research has the
potential to challenge conventional understandings of the world in which we live.
Current tax scholarship is overturning standard understandings of racial inequality
(Moran and Whitford 1996; Brown 2007), gender and family (Jones 1988; Staudt
1996; Brown and Fellows 1996; McCaffery 1997; Kerber 1999; Alstott 2001), the
origins of western democracy (Einhorn 2006a; Kwass 2000) and the welfare state
(Howard 1997; Hacker 2002; Klein 2004), and many other things. We think that
the field may be poised to rewrite conventional accounts of modernity itself by
placing the social relations of taxation at the center of any historical or comparative
account of social change.
We call this emerging field the new fiscal sociology. By using this name, we do
not intend to claim the new field exclusively for academic sociology departments.
The disciplinary affiliations of the contributors to this field – as of the contributors
to this volume – span the fields of economics, political science, law, history, and
public policy in addition to sociology. We chose the name fiscal sociology to honor
the economist Joseph A. Schumpeter, who borrowed that term from his Austrian
contemporary Rudolf Goldscheid (1917) to suggest a science that would transcend
increasingly narrow disciplines and unite the study of economics with the study
of history, politics, and society. The well-known epigraph that begins this chapter
summarizes the promise that Schumpeter saw in fiscal sociology. Schumpeter
called for students of public finance to take a comparative and historical approach
to their subject, and to treat tax policy as both a “symptom” and a “cause” of
large-scale changes in the economy and society. “The public finances are one of the
best starting points for an investigation of society, especially though not exclusively
of its political life,” Schumpeter explained. Of fiscal sociology he wrote, “much
may be expected” (Schumpeter [1918] 1991: 101).
For most of the twentieth century, scholars in history and the social sciences
with rare exceptions heeded only one part of Schumpeter’s call: the admonition
to treat taxation as a symptom of social change – a useful index, say, of democracy,
capitalism, the rise of the state, or the modernization of society. In part, this
was because Schumpeter himself emphasized the search for the “symptomatic
significance of fiscal history” rather than its “causal” aspects (Schumpeter [1918]
1991: 101, emphasis in the original). Because of this, modern scholars discounted
the role of taxation as a cause or engine of change, and privileged the symptomatic
or reflective aspects of fiscal sociology.
There are many reasons why tax policy makes an excellent index of social
change, and thus why scholars have been attracted to studying taxation. Data on
tax revenues are abundant, relative to many of the other things that historians
and social scientists are interested in. Tax records are among the earliest surviving
written records (Webber and Wildavsky 1986), and tax revenues are among the
longest-running statistical series in existence (see Mann 1980). Quantitative tax
data of relatively high quality and comparability are available for an extraordinarily
long swath of historical time and an unusually large number of countries. These
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advantages make tax policy well suited for use as “a measurement instrument
for societal-level analyses” (Lieberman 2002: 91), in applications that range from
studies of the rise of the state to studies of inequality to studies of social solidarity
(see, e.g., Mann 1980; Kraus 1981; Chaudhry 1997; Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006).1
What is new about the new fiscal sociology is its recognition that taxation has a
theoretical or causal – and not just a symptomatic or methodological – importance.
This stems from the definition of taxation itself. Taxation consists of the obliga-
tion to contribute money or goods to the state in exchange for nothing in
particular.2 To be sure, taxes are sometimes earmarked for particular uses, and
in modern, democratic societies, taxation carries the implicit promise that the
resources will be spent on public goods (Webber and Wildavsky 1986).3 Neverthe-
less, a tax is not a fee paid in direct exchange for a service, but rather an obligation
to contribute that the state imposes on its citizens and, if necessary, enforces.
Taxation, so defined, has several features that suggest it may have far-reaching
consequences for understanding modern social life. First, taxation establishes one
of the most widely and persistently experienced relationships that individuals have
with their government and – through their government – with their society as a
whole. Despite the fragmentation of modern societies into myriads of subcultures,
roles, and status groups, paying taxes is one thing that everyone has to do, whether
they are consumers, homeowners, wage earners, or investors. This generality makes
taxation a crucial element in the development of the “imagined community”
(Anderson 1983) of the modern nation-state. When we comply with our tax
obligations, we do not know who in particular shares in our contributions; when
we make use of roads, schools, and other public goods and services, we do not
know from whose tax payments in particular we are benefiting. Taxation enmeshes
us in the web of generalized reciprocity that constitutes modern society.
Second, taxation establishes a dynamic relationship between the taxpayer and
the state, in which there always exists a potential conflict of interest. Taxation is
1 The quality of tax records is, of course, highly variable, but – as Robin Einhorn points out in Chapter
9 – even inaccurate records may be inaccurate in symptomatic ways that provide invaluable evidence
about the past.
2 As early as 1888, the American political economist Richard T. Ely carefully defined taxes as “one-
sided transfers of economic goods or services demanded of the citizens by the constituted authorities
of the land, for meeting the expenses of government, or for some other purpose, with the intention
that a common burden shall be maintained by common contributions or sacrifices” (Ely 1888:
6–7). A century later, the World Bank (1988) similarly defined taxes as “unrequited, compulsory
payments collected primarily by central governments.” Our definition differs from Ely’s and the
World Bank’s insofar as we define taxation as the socially recognized obligation to pay rather than
the payment itself. This definition makes it possible to say, for example, that someone has failed to
meet his or her duty to pay his or her income tax – a statement that would be meaningless if the tax
were defined as the payment.
3 A great deal of welfare spending is accomplished through payroll taxes that are earmarked for
particular purposes. Many scholars suspect that one of the sources of welfare state resilience is the
taxpayers’ sense that they have “bought” rights to welfare state provision through such payments.
However, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the costs any particular taxpayer pays
and the benefits he or she receives: for example, a taxpayer who never uses the health services is still
required to finance them.
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perhaps the only state policy that can be counted on to generate frequent resistance
throughout history and all over the world (see, e.g., Burg 2004). The degree of actual
conflict between taxpayer and ruler varies across place and time, but the potential
for conflict makes this a dynamic relationship. The state, the very guarantor of
social order in the modern world, depends on a relationship that always contains
the latent possibility of conflict and disorder. State authorities have historically
responded to this latent potential for conflict with new forms of taxation and
new forms of rule. The form of tax obligations is constantly changing as different
taxpayers and different rulers seek to renegotiate the relationship to their advantage
(see Chapter 10). Because social order depends on the state, and the state depends
on the resources provided by taxation, this relationship may be renegotiated, but
it will not be severed. The possibility of tension will be continually reproduced
rather than resolved.4
Third, taxation furnishes fungible resources to the state. In this respect, it is
unlike other sacrifices that the state demands from its citizens (e.g., compliance
with traffic laws), and even unlike other forms of state extraction (e.g., conscripted
military service). The resources extracted through taxation are exchangeable for
other resources; they make possible not just one state action, but most if not all
of the state’s activities. And the more extensive the activities of the state, the more
extensive the reliance on taxation – and the broader the potential ramifications
of changes in tax policy. Even the decision to decrease taxes – to diminish the
obligation to contribute to the state – generates controversy and conflict. In modern
states, therefore, taxation is not only a dynamic, potentially conflictual relationship,
but one whose changing forms may have potentially far-reaching implications.
The taxpayer’s decision to evade or resist taxation may challenge the existing social
order, as well as the very basis for enforcing social order – in a way that decisions to
evade or resist speed limits, social policies, or sumptuary laws do not. The state’s
mode of establishing and enforcing taxation may shape the social order in its turn.
The dynamic relations of taxation may thus influence an enormous range of social
outcomes – from the extension of democracy to the formation of the family – as
we detail later.
In short, the relations of taxation are pervasive, dynamic, and central to moder-
nity. Why then did it take so long for social scientists to take up Schumpeter’s project
of fiscal sociology? Why were those scholars who initially responded to Schum-
peter’s clarion call mainly preoccupied with the reflective aspects of taxation and
not its contributory possibilities? Our answers begin with the fragmentation of
classical public finance. In the rest of this chapter, we describe the classical roots
of Schumpeter’s project, and how the disciplinary fragmentation of the modern
4 This is what distinguishes taxes from pillage. Ardant (1965: 35) illustrates this point by recounting
a debate recorded among members of Genghis Khan’s retinue. Having conquered China, the Khan
was advised by one of his generals to slaughter the Chinese peasants and take their land for pasture;
a perspicacious local advisor named Yelu¨ Chucai persuaded him that he could instead generate
more hay for his horses by letting Chinese cultivators live and imposing an annual tax. This policy
was good for the Khan and good for the peasants. Yet it also allowed peasants to live again to fight
another day – and thereby ensured that the conflict of interest between peasants and their exploiters
would remain perennially unresolved.
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research university and the accelerating specialization of intellectual life split the
emerging fiscal sociology apart into several separate and isolated strands of schol-
arship. Finally, we describe the new fiscal sociology that weaves these strands
together – and points the way toward the future of fiscal sociology.
THE CLASSICAL ROOTS OF FISCAL SOCIOLOGY
Schumpeter issued his call for a new fiscal sociology during the fiscal crisis occa-
sioned by World War I, in the dying days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (McCraw
2007; Swedberg 1991). Yet his manifesto was itself the last gasp of classical political
economy rather than the first breath of a new science. It seemed to mark the apogee
of a long tradition of general studies of public finance instead of catapulting the
start of an innovative field of study. The theorists of classical political economy
had been broad-minded students of the social sciences as well as public finance. As
Beverly Moran reminds us in Chapter 12, Adam Smith was a sociological as well as
an economic thinker, who consistently studied taxes in comparative and historical
perspective. Smith was just as interested in the social consequences of taxation
as in its economic consequences, and he offered innovative analyses of how taxes
could create conflict and provide the means for cementing feelings of inclusion
in a common status of citizenship (Smith [1776] 1977). In the mid-nineteenth
century, John Stuart Mill reminded his contemporaries that public finance had an
institutional basis, and situated his discussion of public finance in the context of a
broad theory of modernity and progress (Mill [1871] 2004).
Nineteenth-century European social theorists, for their part, were also catholic
students of public finance. Tocqueville ([1856] 1955) famously traced the class
conflict that erupted during the French Revolution to origins in the prerevolution-
ary tax code (see also Kwass 2000), and argued explicitly that England had avoided
a violent revolution because English tax laws did not draw an explicit boundary
between the nobility and the middle classes. Other early sociological theorists
also devoted attention to the social sources and consequences of taxation. Herbert
Spencer’s Principles of Sociology devoted a chapter to the growth of taxation, which
he attributed to the influence of war (Spencer [1876–96] 1967: 213). Adolph
Wagner, a member of the nineteenth-century German Historical School of eco-
nomics, linked a country’s level of economic development to the increase in the rel-
ative size of its public sector, and hence by implication its revenue-generating abili-
ties (Wagner 1890). Karl Marx identified taxes as “the source of life” of the capitalist
state, and he and Friedrich Engels advocated for steeply progressive income taxes in
the Communist Manifesto (Marx 1852; Marx and Engels 1848). Emile Durkheim’s
dissertation on theDivisionofLabor inSocietywas, among other things, an extended
argument that social development tends inevitably toward the confiscatory tax-
ation of inherited wealth ([1893] 1984: 316–22; see also [1892] 1965: 533–4).
Max Weber saw tax policy as a proving ground for his theories of state authority
and social conflict. Paralleling Rudolf Goldscheid, Weber portrayed tax policy as
an outcome of economic struggle among classes, parties, and status groups, and
he offered the prophetic observation that modern democracies were more and
more “cautious toward the propertied” because governments increasingly must
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compete with one another to attract a tax base of mobile capital (1978 [1922]:
352).
Against this background, the mystery is not why Schumpeter dreamed of a fiscal
sociology, but why his call went unanswered for so long. One reason is institutional
rather than intellectual. Schumpeter wrote at a time when the forces of profes-
sionalization and academic specialization were sundering public economics from
history and the other social sciences (Furner 1975; Ross 1991; Haskell 1977; Bender
1997). Academic entrepreneurs of Schumpeter’s generation sought to distinguish
these disciplines from one another by delineating areas of study proper to each.
Many questions at the intersection of these disciplines consequently fell through
the cracks that opened when they pulled apart. As Neil Smelser and Richard Swed-
berg write, sociological studies of economic life more generally “declined after
1920 and would not return to full vigor before the 1980s” (Smelser and Swedberg
2005: 11). Fiscal sociology declined as well.
The new scholarly division of labor created efficiencies, but it also had perverse
consequences. For much of the twentieth century, most historians, sociologists,
legal scholars, and political scientists did not ask questions about the social or
institutional roots or consequences of taxation, because they had surrendered the
study of public finance to economists. Economists did not ask questions about
the social or institutional roots or consequences of taxation, because they had
surrendered the study of such questions to sociologists and other social scien-
tists. Progress in public finance came at the price of narrowing the field. As the
field of public economics came to dominate the study of taxation, noneconomic
questions seemed to fall away. Gone were the “detailed descriptions of tax rules
or administrative issues that characterized many earlier public finance books,”
wrote Martin Feldstein approvingly, as he reflected on the contents of a 1959 text-
book that was the so-called bible of public economics when he entered the field;
their place had been taken by “graphs and algebra showing the partial equilib-
rium effects of taxes on prices and quantities and the associated effects on dead-
weight losses” (Feldstein 2002: xxvii). With the detailed descriptions of tax institu-
tions went the theoretically informed study of their social origins and their social
consequences.
THE FRAGMENTATION OF FISCAL SOCIOLOGY
The roots of today’s new fiscal sociology lie in the separate scholarly traditions
that followed this breakup. Schumpeter’s prophetic essay had presented taxation
as an actually existing social contract, the outcome of a historic bargain among
rulers and ruled forged in a particular time and place. His essay raised several
fundamental questions about that contract: Why does the bargain take particular
forms? How is the bargain maintained – or what sustains taxpayers’ consent to
be taxed on an ongoing basis? And how does the fiscal bargain affect the culture
and “forms of life” (Schumpeter [1918] 1991: 100) prevailing in a society? These
questions did not vanish with the splintering of the social sciences.
For most of the twentieth century, however, the scholars who pursued these
questions were isolated from each other. Small groups of scholars in academic
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institutions outside of the United States, and in historically oriented corners of the
professions of economics and law, nurtured relatively insular theoretical traditions.
Each tradition emphasized one of Schumpeter’s fundamental questions, to the
near exclusion of the others. And – although most scholars sought to answer
these questions by discovering universal laws about the interplay of taxation and
fundamental social forces – each tradition drew on different classical sources
and emphasized different forces. These traditions painstakingly assembled the
building blocks of the syncretic new fiscal sociology, although their results were
often unsatisfying on their own terms.
Modernization Theory and the Consequences of Economic Development
The first question of traditional fiscal sociology was why tax systems took a par-
ticular form; and the first strand of fiscal sociology argued that the answer lay
in economic development. We call this strand modernization theory because it
resembled and sometimes overlapped more general theories of modernization in
sociology and political science (e.g., Rostow 1960). In fiscal sociology, modern-
ization theory drew on work by early institutional economists, most notably the
writings of Edwin R. A. Seligman ([1895] 1931, 1902, 1911), who was heavily
influenced by the writings of the German Historical School (Mehrotra 2007). It
was kept alive into the mid-twentieth century by scholars of economics and law
who advanced it as the so-called progressive interpretation of American tax history
(Blakey and Blakey 1940; Ratner 1942; Paul 1954), and by development economists
from the United States and Western Europe who were called on to advise tax offi-
cials in developing countries in the context of decolonization and Cold War foreign
aid. As W. Elliot Brownlee shows (Chapter 14), Carl Shoup was a leader among
this group of development tax economists. Advisors like Shoup found themselves
confronted with the questions of which tax policies were best suited to which social
environments, and how tax institutions responded to social and economic change.
Scholars in this tradition sought in particular to explain how and why states
develop modern tax systems, where modern was understood to mean a common
set of tax instruments that were efficient, productive, and equitable. The answer
was that economic development inevitably led societies to develop modern forms
of taxation. Seligman gave this thesis its classic and most categorical statement:
“Fiscal conditions are always an outcome of economic relations” ([1895] 1931: 1).
And economic relations, it was assumed, followed a common developmental tra-
jectory. Traditional agrarian societies at first produced relatively little surplus to
tax. States in these societies were therefore likely to levy low taxes, and to levy
those taxes mainly in kind – for example, as a share of the harvest – rather than
in money. The growth of markets and the development of industrial production
gradually made new kinds of taxes possible. Economic development increased
wealth, making a greater surplus available to tax. The increase of trade made it
possible for the first time to levy taxes on trade rather than on the produce of land.
And development also provided a convenient way to measure the tax base – in
the form of money prices (Eisenstadt 1963; Bird and Oldman 1964; Ardant 1965;
Hinrichs 1966; Musgrave 1969; Seebohm 1976).
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Economic development was also said to bring democracy (cf. Lipset 1959), which
positively impelled states to implement modern taxes by multiplying the legitimate
claims on the state’s financial resources. Expanding markets created new demands
for infrastructure – roads, schools, utilities – that required the state to raise ever
larger sums for public goods (Wiseman and Peacock 1961). And political equality
led to demands for redistributive taxation. Seligman’s comparative and historical
studies of nearly every aspect of taxation expressed this view of the relentless drive
of egalitarian forces: the history of all tax policy was a series of successively closer
approximations to an egalitarian ideal, of which the modern American tax state
might have been the end point (Seligman [1895] 1931). Subsequent progressive
historians modified this seemingly whiggish assumption of a historical teleology –
but retained the assumption that modernization brought democracy and equality
in taxation. With the advent of widespread suffrage for the lower economic strata,
“the people” triumphed over “the rich” or “the interests,” democracy triumphed
over privilege, and tax policy became increasingly egalitarian (Blakey and Blakey
1940; Ratner 1942; Paul 1954; Buenker 1985).
The great lacuna in modernization theory was its inability to explain variation
in tax systems among modern societies. To be sure, modernization theorists did
not always predict that societies would converge on the same tax system. The
sweeping synthesis by Hinrichs (1966) argued that modernization would ultimately
lead tax systems to diverge, because the growth and differentiation of modern
economies allowed authorities more choices among policy instruments and “tax
handles.” Yet having pointed out the diversity of modern tax systems, Hinrichs
and other modernization theorists threw up their hands. The residual variation
that could not be explained by economic development was simply chalked up to
“culture,” understood to mean a set of preferences that were unique, unchanging,
and ultimately inaccessible to scientific or historical explanation (see also Webber
and Wildavsky 1986). With this linear view of historical change, modernization
theory proved in retrospect to be highly ahistorical, ignoring the specificity of
cultural and institutional factors that could produce tremendous variation within
similarly developed economies and polities.
Elite Theory: Why People Consent to Taxes
The second school of traditional fiscal sociology focused on what might be called
the “noncontractual basis” of the fiscal contract (cf. Durkheim [1893] 1984) – the
institutionalized norms that led taxpayers to consent to a particular fiscal bargain.
During the early and mid-twentieth century, applied studies of taxpayer compli-
ance proliferated in the disciplines of law, criminology, accounting, psychology,
and economics. The broader question of taxpayer consent, however, as Evan Lieber-
man points out in Chapter 6, encompasses not only individual compliance but
also political acquiescence. Taxpayers who comply with taxes – in the narrow sense
that they pay what is legally required – might nevertheless protest those taxes, vote
to change them, or even take up arms against them.
Scholarship on taxpayer consent in this broader sense was largely confined to a
tradition that drew on the classical Italian sociology of elites (Michels [1915] 1968;
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Mosca 1994; Pareto [1916] 1963). We call this tradition elite theory.5 The most
influential text in this strand of fiscal sociology was probably the Theory of Fiscal
Illusions written in the 1890s by the Italian economist Amilcare Puviani ([1903]
1973). Elite theory survived into the postwar era among European scholars of
public finance (Laure 1956; Schmo¨lders 1960; Volpi 1973). Under the influence of
the economist James Buchanan, who encountered the Italian scienza delle finanze
during a Fulbright year abroad, elite theory entered American public economics
in the 1960s, and was an important influence on the development of public choice
theory (see Buchanan 1960). For American economists who were critical of the
Keynesian consensus that dominated the profession in the post-World War II era,
elite theory’s disenchanted view of public officials was appealing, and this tradition
of fiscal sociology provided powerful tools for questioning the benevolence and
efficacy of state planning (Medema 2000; Morgan and Rutherford 1998).
Proponents of elite theory described a fundamental conflict of interest between
rulers and subjects. Rulers sought to maximize their revenues. Subjects sought
to keep resources for themselves. Why then would rational taxpayers consent
to their own exploitation? The answer advanced by Puviani was that they had
incorrect information (Puviani [1903] 1973). Rulers could exploit their subjects’
pocketbooks most thoroughly by designing tax policies to exploit their subjects’
perceptual biases.6
The imperative to conceal taxes explained many of the common institutional
features of modern tax systems. Puviani’s treatise took the form of a catalog
of techniques by which policy makers could conceal the burden of taxation and
exaggerate the benefits of public spending. By the 1970s, there was a small literature
exploring the hypothesis that “fiscal illusion” explained why voters consent to heavy
taxes (for critical reviews, see Gemmell, Morrissey, and Pinar 2002; Mueller 1989;
Oates 1988).
Another strand of elite theory, drawing heavily on the economics and sociology
of Pareto ([1916] 1963), led public choice scholars in the United States to explore
the role of formal political institutions. Led by Buchanan and Gordon Tullock
(1962), public choice scholars explored the constitutional rules that might allow
democratically elected governments to be manipulated by rent-seeking bureau-
crats, politicians, and special-interest groups. With the Leviathan captured by
special interests, they argued, political leaders could use taxation to redistribute
resources for the benefit of an elite minority. In subsequent decades, U.S. economic
and political historians motivated by public choice theory and sympathetic to a
growing conservative intellectual and political movement came to see the growth
of taxation as an expression of the power of special-interest groups. They por-
trayed the creation of new tax powers and the suppression of tax protests as critical
5 We call this stream of fiscal sociology elite theory to emphasize its continuity with the classical study
of elites in Italian sociology and political science. It should not be confused with the power elite
theory more familiar to American and British political sociologists, which treated the state as an
instrument for powerful capitalist interests (Domhoff 1998; Miliband 1974; Mills 1956).
6 In this way, elite theory can be seen as a forerunner of a more recent interest in behavioral public
finance, which also attends to cognitive biases and limitations, although without seeking to privilege
the position of elites. See McCaffery and Slemrod (2006).
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episodes in the struggle of rent-seeking groups to expand their influence (Higgs
1987; Baack and Ray 1985; Beito 1989).
The tradition of elite theory no doubt contributed to many varieties of “new
institutionalism” in the 1980s, and public choice theory continues to yield new
insights into the political economy of taxation. Yet many scholars found the the-
ory unsatisfactory for its neglect of the question of the historical development of
institutions.7 Its focus on explaining why taxpayers consent to a particular equilib-
rium left it ill equipped to study how institutions change over time, or why different
societies might develop different sets of institutional arrangements. For broader
insights into the patterns of institutional change, scholars of fiscal sociology turned
back to modernization theory – or to a third tradition that emphasized war.
Militarist Theory: The Consequences of Taxes for State Capacity
The third tradition of post-WWII-era fiscal sociology followed Schumpeter’s inter-
est in the social and cultural outcomes of taxation. The development of sophisti-
cated tools for measuring the economic consequences of taxation was one of the
great triumphs of public economics in the postwar era, but few scholars took up
Schumpeter’s call to study social and cultural consequences. How did particular
fiscal bargains affect civilizations, cultures, and ways of life? For Schumpeter, these
were crucial questions of fiscal sociology. The third strand of postwar fiscal soci-
ology posed these questions – and developed an answer that had been proposed
by Schumpeter himself. The social consequence of taxation lay primarily in its
importance for military conquest.
We call this tradition militarist theory, because scholars in this tradition argued
that military competition and the development of taxation went hand in hand. Like
elite theory, militarist theory had classical roots that can be traced to Spencer’sPrin-
ciples of Sociology, and it later became popular among German and Austrian social
theorists in the early twentieth century (Goldscheid [1925] 1962; Hintze 1975;
Schumpeter [1918] 1991; Weber [1922] 1978). It gained new traction in the 1970s at
a time when western political economies were confronting the socioeconomic dis-
locations associated with the end of Fordism. Consequently, modernization theory
lost its cachet. Critics of modernization theory in the disciplines of history, sociol-
ogy, and political science who sought to understand the pattern of European state
formation turned to militarist theory instead (Finer 1975; Mann 1980; Tilly 1975).
The central question for militarist theory was to explain the rise of the modern
bureaucratic state. In the classical version of this theory as expounded by Schum-
peter, taxation was the key to the rise of the state, because taxation furnished
the resources that allowed states to make war and eliminate their competitors. As
Schumpeter told the story, the princely households of the European Middle Ages
had drawn their funds not from taxes, but from personal dues owed to the princes
as individuals, and from the exploitation of their own lands. At the turn of the
sixteenth century, however, “the growing expenses of warfare” rendered this system
obsolete. As the costs of warfare escalated, princes turned to consultative bodies of
7 For a general criticism of “rational choice institutionalism” along these lines, see Thelen (1999).
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nobles and burghers – the estates – for more funds. Princes demanded the right
to levy taxes for the common defense; in exchange, the estates won the right to
administer the taxes, and began to develop a public bureaucracy that was indepen-
dent of the princely household. With the separation of the public purse from the
prince’s private household, “the tax state had arrived – its idea and its machinery”
(Schumpeter [1918] 1991: 105). And the tax state was a machine for making war.
Although Schumpeter’s essay was written during the Great War to illuminate a
particular political conjuncture – in particular, to raise the prescient question of
the consequences of mounting war debts for the stability of the postwar order in
Central Europe – the Darwinian logic of his argument was easily generalized to
other times and places. Subsequent scholars applied militarist theory to explain
the evolution of the state throughout history. States at war need to mobilize
resources rapidly. Moreover, the fiscal demands of war escalate over time, because
states are in perpetual competition to develop the most advanced military force
and thereby secure an advantage over their rivals. States that adopt the most
productive taxes and institutionalize the most modern forms of tax administration
are able to mobilize ever greater quantities of labor and materiel, and therefore
have the edge in this perpetual arms race. The historical sociologist Michael Mann
spelled out the logic thus: “A state that wished to survive had to increase its
extractive capacity to pay for professional armies and/or navies. Those that did not
would be crushed on the battlefield and absorbed into others” (Mann 1980: 195).
Victorious states achieved their victories by institutionalizing the most effective and
efficient forms of resource extraction – meaning, in practice, taxation. Vanquished
states had modern tax policies imposed on them by their conquerors. In the long
run, military competition led all surviving states to converge on efficient and
productive tax systems, and those tax systems in turn led to the militarization and
bureaucratization of society.
Militarist theory had its weaknesses. Like modernization theory and elite theory,
it had difficulty accounting for divergent tax structures among states that survived
the winnowing of centuries of warfare. The theory also seemed to have little to
say about the transition from the warfare state to the welfare state in the most
developed economies of the twentieth century. These states increasingly put their
tax institutions to work funding health, welfare, and educational establishments,
eventually outstripping even their spending on defense. Explaining this fiscal trend
seemed to require attention to economic development and political institutions –
the stuff of modernization theory and elite theory.
THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY
The new fiscal sociology began when these three strands of research began to merge
in the late twentieth century. The new scholarship built on the foundations laid
by an earlier generation of scholars, but it also engaged with this earlier literature
by questioning its premises and stretching its parameters. As previously noted,
developments within each camp led authors to look to the others for new insights.
Developments outside of academia also played a part in bringing these separate
streams of research together. Although the American tradition of tax resistance and
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anti-statism seemed to be latent during the prosperity of the post-WWII period,
these forces were on the resurgence during the last third of the twentieth century
(Keller 2007; Zelizer 2003). A series of high-profile fiscal crises in American state
and local governments and the emergence of property tax revolts in the 1970s con-
sequently brought renewed attention to the classics of fiscal sociology (O’Connor
1973; Bell 1973; Musgrave 1980; Padgett 1981; Block 1981; Shefter 1985; McDonald
1986; Hansen 1983). Taxation also took on a new prominence in American national
politics, as well-organized conservative interest groups exploited the intellectual
exhaustion of Keynesianism (Gray 1998; Blyth 2002), the end of the “era of easy
finance” (Brownlee 1996; Steuerle 2004), and the growing dissatisfaction with sub-
national property taxes (Sears and Citrin 1983; Martin 2008) to assail the principle
of progressive taxation, and to seek tax cuts as a means of de-funding the welfare
state or “starving the beast” (Hacker and Pierson 2005b; Wilentz 2008). Outside
of the United States, the increasing international mobility of capital led to fears of
international tax competition, and – along with the influential U.S. Tax Reform
Act of 1986 – contributed to what scholars have described as an international
wave of tax reform in the 1980s and 1990s (Tanzi 1995; Steinmo 2003b; Swank,
1998, 2006). Similarly, the end of the Cold War brought a renewed focus on issues
of development, political economies in transition, and the financing practices of
failed states (Bird 1992; Burgess and Stern 1993; Turley 2006; Bra¨utigam, Fjeldstad,
and Moore 2008). All of these developments drew new scholars from across the
social sciences into the comparative and historical study of taxation.
The newcomers began to discover and weave together strands of fiscal sociology
that had hitherto remained separate. Influential works by Charles Tilly (1985) and
Margaret Levi (1988) explicitly drew the elitist and militarist traditions together
in what Levi called a “theory of predatory rule” by war-making elites. As scholars
of state formation and political power, these initial – and perhaps inadvertent –
pioneers of the new fiscal sociology were drawn indirectly to taxation because it
was a central part of their larger research agenda to understand and explain the
sources and implications of state power, an agenda that was shared by many other
historically-minded social scientists (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol,1985)
Following this lead, other scholars have continued to test and refine the fiscal-
military model of state formation with newly available data on early modern
Europe (Brewer 1990; Ertman 1997; Bonney 1999; Kiser and Linton 2001), sub-
Saharan Africa (Herbst 2000), the Levant (Heydemann 2000), China (Wong 1987),
and the Americas (Bensel 1990; Centeno 1997; Edling 2003; Thies 2004, 2005,
2006; Sparrow 1996; Johnson 2005; Bank, Stark, and Thorndike 2008). Although
the findings of this research program are not all easily summarized, much of the
literature points to the need for synthetic models that explain patterns of tax policy
development by the interaction of military competition with institutional features
of the polity and with patterns of economic development.
A similar, though more conscious, institutionalist synthesis began to arise from
the late 1980s through the early 2000s among scholars working on tax policy in
democratic states of the twentieth century. Independent studies by the sociologist
John L. Campbell (1993), the historians Elliot Brownlee (1996a, b), Robert Stanley
(1993), and Martin Daunton (2001, 2002), and the political scientists John Witte
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(1985), B. Guy Peters (1991), Ronald King (1993), and Sven Steinmo (1993) explic-
itly sought to bring together war, economic development, and political institutions
into synthetic theories that would explain the development of the tax state. Unlike
the earlier wave of fiscal-military theorists, this group of scholars explicitly saw
their object as understanding not only state formation in general, but tax policy
in particular. Despite differences, all of these scholars argued for a model of fiscal
development that treated economic development as a motor force – but one that
propelled the tax state along tracks that were laid down by political institutions
and along a course that was set during wars and other moments of crisis.
Scholars from all of these traditions also began to turn from general history
to comparative history. They abandoned blanket contrasts between tradition and
modernity and the search for general covering laws of history. Instead, students
of fiscal sociology today are more likely to puzzle over differences in tax policy
across states or countries at similar levels of development, particularly because, as
John L. Campbell notes in the epilogue to this book, variations in tax structure
seem resilient even in the face of putative pressures to converge brought about by
globalization (see e.g., Kiser and Lang 2001; Slemrod 2004; Swank and Steinmo
2002; Mumford 2002; Ganghof 2007; Livingston 2006; Sokoloff and Zolt 2006).
These scholars characteristically use comparison to arrive at explanations for these
differences rather than to search for universal laws. Even scholars who are not
themselves comparativists have generally abandoned the pretense – common in
earlier waves of fiscal sociology – that the tax history of any one society, such as
the United States, illustrates a universal pattern.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the new studies differ in several ways from public
finance as it is taught today in most departments of economics. First, the new
fiscal sociology typically focuses on informal social institutions. Whereas much of
contemporary economics and the political science of budgeting examines what
John Carey has called “parchment institutions” (2000) – mainly constitutions and
written laws – much of the excitement of the new fiscal scholarship comes from the
discovery that taxation is deeply enmeshed in social relationships that are no less
institutionalized for not being written down. Tax policy shapes and is shaped by
patterns of public trust; patterns of social cleavage; institutions of family, religion,
work, and leisure – the list is long and growing, as the contributors to this book
illustrate.
Second, the new studies take historical sequence and context seriously. They
often draw on theories such as path dependence to argue that the development of
social institutions is often defined by critical junctures, positive feedback processes,
divergent and contingent historical paths, and institutional continuities. Following
Schumpeter’s lead, the new fiscal sociology attends to the importance of seminal
historical events in the unfolding of social and political processes.8 Modernization
theory had envisioned history as a linear path, with different societies following
8 As Schumpeter explained, “The events of fiscal history” provide insight “into the laws of social being
and becoming and into the driving forces of the fate of nations, as well as into the manner in which
concrete conditions, and in particular organizational forms, grow and pass away” (Schumpeter
[1918] 1991: 101, emphasis in the original).
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lockstep (from the most traditional to the most modern). The new studies treat
history instead as a garden of forking paths, with critical junctures – usually wars
and economic crises – marking moments of choice. Once a society is committed
to a certain developmental path, positive feedbacks may reinforce that choice. It is
this insight that underlies this book’s focus on historical explanation: We agree that
effective explanations for many fiscal and social phenomena must be historical.
The observation of an economic or political equilibrium at any single point in time
is not sufficient to explain observed outcomes in a world where multiple equilibria
are possible.
Third, the new studies often focus on phenomena that are properly measured
at the level of the society rather than the individual. This book exemplifies this
aspect of the field with studies of wars, durable social distinctions, religious tra-
ditions, gender regimes, labor systems, and other such macrosocial phenomena.
In addition, the new studies show a corresponding interest in the relationship
between taxation and the biggest questions of the social sciences – such as the rise
of democracy, the development of the state, and the sources of social solidarity.
The new fiscal sociology promises to shed light on all of the classic questions
raised by Schumpeter – the social sources of tax systems, the determinants of
taxpayer consent, and the social and cultural consequences of taxation. Treated
by separate traditions for most of the late twentieth century, these questions are
now addressed by crosscutting literatures on economic development, political
institutions, and war. In particular, the new fiscal sociology points toward a new
theory of taxation as a social contract that multiplies a society’s infrastructural
power. While many details remain to be worked out, the new theory suggests that
economic development does not inevitably lead to a particular form of taxation,
but rather that institutional contexts, political conflicts, and contingent events
lead to a diversity of tax states in the modern world; that taxpayer consent is best
explained not as coercion, predation, or illusion, but as a collective bargain in
which taxpayers give up resources in exchange for collective goods that amplify the
society’s productive capacities; and that because taxation is central not only to the
state’s capacity in war, but in fact to all of social life, the different forms of the tax
state explain many of the political and social differences between countries.
By focusing on these three aspects of taxation – the state-based sources of tax
policy, the development of taxpayer consent, and the implications of taxation –
this volume illustrates the potential of the new fiscal sociology.
Part I. Social Sources of Taxation: American Tax Policy
in Comparative Perspective
Part I examines the sources of the fiscal-social contract from the point of view of
one of the contracting parties, the state. Why do particular states settle on particular
tax policies? A central premise of the new fiscal sociology is that answering this
question requires attention to particular histories. Our contributors illustrate this
approach by focusing on the development of tax policy in one particularly well-
known, distinctive, and influential case: the United States. We argued earlier that
one of the hallmarks of the new fiscal sociology is the realization that particular
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moments of history may set different societies down contingent paths that never
converge. In what should be considered a vigorous demonstration of the promise
of this approach, the contributions of the new fiscal sociology are painting a
remarkable picture of the historical development of American political economy.
In a now well-known example, tax scholars have upended the standard account
of the United States as an underdeveloped and stingy welfare state. Employing Stan-
ley Surrey’s path-breaking analysis of tax expenditures (Surrey 1973), scholars have
demonstrated that the U.S. welfare state is not a laggard in comparative perspective,
but merely unusually reliant on indirect spending via tax expenditures that skew
toward middle- and upper-income people (Howard 1997; Adema 1999; Hacker
2002; Klein 2004). An equally compelling development – well-known among tax
scholars, but not common knowledge among students of the welfare state – is the
finding that the United States had a more progressive tax structure for most of the
twentieth century than the big, social democratic welfare states. This peculiar tax
system can be traced to the beginnings of the modern American tax system and the
Progressive-era impulse to use direct and graduated levies to shift fiscal obligations
toward those U.S. regions and classes that had the greatest tax paying ability (Rat-
ner 1967; Mehrotra 2005a; Morgan and Prasad, 2009). The result was that at least
until very recently, the United States taxed capital at higher rates, and labor and
consumption at lower rates, than the welfare states of Europe, including egalitarian
outposts like France and Sweden (Steinmo 1993; Carey and Tchilinguirian 2003;
Martinez-Mongay 2003; Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar, 1994; Lindert 2004; OECD
2001; Sørensen 2004; Volkerink and de Haan 2001). According to the best recent
study of comparative tax progressivity, even if we put aside the question of national
consumption taxes the United States had a more progressive tax structure than
France or the United Kingdom in 1970, although the neoliberal tax cuts of the
1980s have reversed the comparative progressivity picture (Piketty and Saez 2006;
see Prasad and Deng 2009 on the measurement of comparative tax progressivity).
Together these observations about U.S. tax policy have had implications for
several strands of comparative-historical research. First, they have helped to solve
one of the most important puzzles in welfare-state scholarship: how the large
social democratic welfare states have survived the internationalization of capital
markets. They have done so because they rely on consumption taxes, which are
not vulnerable to the globalization of finance or trade (Ganghof 2006; Lindert
2004). Second, these findings place contemporary American politics in a new
light. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that domestic economic policymaking
in contemporary America is all about taxation, in that the quest of the corporate
lobbyists who descend upon Washington normally ends with a tax benefit of some
kind (see Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998; Birnbaum and Murray 1987). This
pattern suggests that the vigor with which lobbying is conducted in the United
States may not be an index of the power of business, but rather of the cleverness
of politicians and of their success at generating a structure that brings them steady
campaign funds (Doerenberg and McChesney 1987; McChesney 1997; McCaffery
and Cohen 2006). Third, some analysts have suggested that the greater progressivity
of the American tax structure is a factor in the greater intensity of neoliberalism
there (Wilensky 2002; Campbell and Morgan 2005; Prasad 2006).
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In short, as Schumpeter predicted, looking at the American fiscal structure has
revealed “the thunder of history” for students of comparative political economy. It
has also put a new set of issues on the agenda: How the big welfare states came to
rely so heavily on consumption taxes, and what this finding might tell us about the
rise of capitalism in the advanced industrial countries and the developing world.
The contributors to this book attend to this new picture of American political
economy, and contribute to larger debates over how states settle on particular forms
of taxation. We begin Part I with Joseph J. Thorndike’s chapter on the New Deal.
As Thorndike shows, the twenty-first-century conflicts over progressive taxation
have deep roots in American tax history. Thorndike echoes the judgment of prior
scholars that the New Deal was a key moment in the formation of the American
tax state (see Leff 1984; Higgs 1987; Beito 1989; Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein
1994; Coleman 1996; Brownlee 1996b). Yet one of the New Deal’s key tax laws,
the Revenue Act of 1935, did not establish major new revenue-raising capacity as
the adoption of national consumption taxes in subsequent decades would do in
European countries, nor did it reward interest groups. What it did was attempt
to soak the rich – and thereby contribute to the entrenched mistrust and mutual
hostility that was so characteristic of the relationship between wealthy American
businesspeople and the state for much of the twentieth century. Thorndike traces
the 1935 Act to the outcome of a competition between legal and economic experts
in the Roosevelt administration, and argues that Roosevelt’s own preferences –
rooted in prior conflicts – contributed significantly to defining the direction of
policy. Thus, in this key state-building episode, political elites followed patterns
of conflict laid down in earlier conflicts over policy, and paved the way for future
conflicts in turn.
We then turn to a dialogue between Andrea Campbell and Fred Block on the
sources of the current period of seemingly continual tax cuts. Campbell finds
the origins of this phenomenon in the connection between taxpayer attitudes and
the rhetoric of elite politics. Campbell argues that American voters’ attitudes to-
ward taxation have generally corresponded to the level of taxation. She presents the
first complete time series of data on American public opinion toward taxes since
the 1930s, and demonstrates that the percentage of voters who believed that federal
income taxes were “too high” co-varied closely with the actual tax burden. Yet she
also shows that discontent with taxes does not always translate readily into political
behavior. Taxes became politically salient when elites introduced them onto the
public agenda as a subject of political competition. Thus, following in the footsteps
of Puviani, Campbell suggests that public officials can influence taxpayers’ behavior
at least somewhat independently of the actual costs and benefits of taxation. It is
the combination of rising tax burdens and a new elite rhetoric that has put tax cuts
at the center of the policy agenda since the 1970s – and that led to the dramatic tax
cuts of 2001 and 2003.
How, then, did American political elites come to place tax cuts at the center of
the policy agenda? Fred Block’s chapter takes up the case of the Bush tax cuts of
2001 and 2003 and attempts to explain what the analysis of public opinion leaves
unexplained. Drawing on a historical analogy with the ideologies prominent in
nineteenth-century England, Block argues that American political elites at the turn
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of the twenty-first century cynically employed an individualistic ideology to forge
a new coalition between religious conservatives and self-interested business elites.
This electoral coalition is antitax because its individualistic ideology denies all
social obligations that extend beyond the family. Block argues that this ideology –
embraced by ordinary people as a comforting response to uncertainty in a glob-
alized world – has kept tax cuts at the top of the federal agenda for the last thirty
years. When the economic cycle begins to turn downward, as it has in recent years,
tax cuts frequently re-emerge as a counter-cyclical measure to manage the national
economy. Thus, regardless of whether tax cuts are pursued as an indirect way to
shrink the size of government or to stimulate a beleaguered economy, tax cuts
seem to have become a favored policy instrument, and debates over tax cuts have
become a recurrent feature of the American political scene.
Finally, Christopher Howard examines those other hardy American perennials,
tax expenditures – tax benefits that lead to indirect spending in the form of foregone
revenues. Howard shows that tax preferences for social welfare objectives are an
enormous and overlooked component of the American welfare state and that they
are skewed toward middle- and upper-middle income groups. Building on his
earlier work (1997), Howard’s chapter explores how the dynamics of American
party politics at the turn of the twenty-first century have led to the maintenance
and, in some cases, expansion of tax expenditures that provide social provisions.
Although Democratic and Republican lawmakers have disagreed about tax rates,
they seem to have found common ground on the use of tax policy as social policy.
These tax breaks, moreover, have helped constitute interest groups by providing the
cognitive boundaries and common interests that cement new coalitions together
(see also Hacker 2002; Steensland 2008).
Our contributors’ observations question the thesis of “American exceptio-
nalism,” because they cast doubt on the interpretation of the United States as
a weak, laissez-faire state.9 Americans have been as willing to embed the market
through state intervention as the European democracies are, but this embedded-
ness has taken the form of progressive taxation. Moreover, the United States does
have a large welfare state, but instead of functioning as the welfare states of Europe
do (first collecting revenue through taxes, and then disbursing those resources in
the form of welfare payments), it works by foregoing tax collection in targeted
ways. In challenging one set of stereotypes about American distinctiveness, these
chapters also introduce a more sophisticated argument about ways in which the
United States is different from Europe, and a new set of questions: Why did the
United States adopt this “soak the rich” method of taxation rather than the national
consumption taxes that finance Europe? Why have American political elites been
unusually interested in tax policy at some moments and less so at others? What
led the United States to its distinctive reliance on tax expenditures? Did tax reduc-
tions play a role in the economic crisis that began in 2007, and can the American
state continue to convince creditors of its ability to raise tax revenue to pay its
debts?
9 For a recent summary of the sociohistorical literature challenging the traditional notion of the
laissez-faire American state, see William J. Novak (2008).
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The contributions in Part I add up to a rich picture of the American fiscal
state. The American social contract is one that insists on progressive taxation –
thereby provoking the conflicts over taxation that dominate the headlines and also
permitting the tax expenditures that more quietly but perhaps more substantially
delineate the features of economic life in this country. Our contributors would
not argue that the American tax system presents the generic picture of modernity,
as some progressive historians imagined; but the chapters on the United States
in this book do exemplify general processes of path dependence that set different
states on particular paths and thereby give rise to the diversity of tax states in the
modern world. Tax policy is the outcome of particular political conflicts, and the
lines of conflict were laid down by prior tax-policy choices. As we will see below,
the outcome of these conflicts over tax policy may affect many other facts about
political life, inequality, and state capacity – even those that seem remote from
taxation.
Part II. Taxpayer Consent
Part II of the book examines the origins of the fiscal contract from the point of
view of the taxpayer. The chapters in this part ask why people consent to particular
tax systems. This question was the central concern of elite theory, and our contrib-
utors all recognize the importance of political elites and political institutions. In
other respects, however, they exemplify the new fiscal sociology in their syncretic
approach to the question. Several chapters explicitly draw together war, economic
development, and political institutions to explain variation in consent. They also
attend to institutionalized social divisions and political coalitions.
Perhaps most importantly, the new fiscal sociology departs from the individualist
premises of elite theory to argue that taxpayer consent is the product of a social
contract. These scholars argue that taxation cannot be explained only as illusion or
coercion, but should be seen instead as a collective fiscal bargain in which taxpayers
may surrender resources willingly if they believe that those taxes fairly reflect the
cost of providing for the public good. To say that taxpayers are concerned with
fairness means that taxpayers are not concerned only with their own individual
costs and benefits – all taxpayers’ consent is crucially dependent on how they
believe other taxpayers are treated.
The new fiscal sociology of taxpayer consent builds on the foundational contri-
bution by Levi (1988), who proposed a theory of “quasi-voluntary compliance” to
complement her theory of predatory rule. Levi posed the question of why taxpayers
choose to comply with their obligations instead of evading taxes. In contrast to the
standard model of tax compliance derived from the economics of crime – which
treats the decision to comply as a straightforward function of the risk of detection
and the cost of punishment – Levi drew on the elite theory tradition to argue
that taxpayer compliance has a “voluntary” element. Taxpayers comply with their
obligations when they perceive their tax obligation as a fair exchange for private
or collective goods provided by the ruler. To be sure, tax authorities do exercise
coercive authority – in this sense, compliance is quasi-voluntary – but Levi argued
that the main purpose of coercion is to persuade the taxpayer that she is paying a
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fair price by demonstrating that other taxpayers are being forced to pay it as well
(1988: 54).
Levi’s contribution left several crucial questions unanswered and thereby opened
avenues for further inquiry. One such unanswered question is where norms of fair
taxation come from. Recent comparative historical scholarship on tax protest and
tax evasion has emphasized that people in different times and places have held very
different ideas about what counts as a fair fiscal bargain. The new fiscal sociology has
typically sought to explain these norms by showing historically how the policies
and practices of governments have institutionalized particular expectations of
government responsiveness (Lo 1990), administrative practice (Bergman 2003;
Martin 2008), or channeled the flow of information (Wilensky 1975, 2002) in
ways that may provoke evasion or protest. There is much work still to do on which
policies acquire the weight of customary norms in which social and historical
contexts.
Another unanswered question is how taxpayers define the collectivity whose wel-
fare they wish to maximize. Taxpayers may acquiesce to be taxed when they think
it contributes to the collective good – but which collective? A pioneering effort by
Lieberman (2003) identified moments of constitution-writing as the critical junc-
ture when ideas about the collectivity are institutionalized. He argued that taxpayer
consent in Brazil and South Africa in the twentieth century depended on differ-
ent conceptions of race and nation that were encoded in their respective national
constitutions at moments of national founding.10 Other recent scholarship has
identified tax policy itself as a source of social boundaries and political identities –
so that taxpayers in regimes that depend heavily on progressive income taxes may
come to identify themselves as members of an income-tax bracket, say, while
taxpayers in consumption-tax-dependent regimes may arrive at a more broadly
shared political identity (Wilensky 2002; Kato 2003; Morgan and Campbell 2005;
Prasad 2005, 2006).
In Part II, our contributors continue to push these frontiers in the study of
taxpayer consent. Evan S. Lieberman opens this section with a bold restatement
of his theoretical argument that identities and social boundaries affect taxpayers’
consent and hence state capacities. The perception of collective goods and the
willingness to sacrifice for the collectivity requires a prior shared conception of the
collectivity – a division of the world into “we” and “they,” in-group and out-group.
By contrasting tax policy with government responses to the acquired immunode-
ficiency syndrome/human immunodeficiency virus (AIDS/HIV) pandemic in two
starkly contrasting collectivities – the nation-states of Brazil and South Africa –
Lieberman underscores the importance of social and ethnic boundaries and his-
torical processes. Taxpayers may be less likely to sacrifice if they lack a strong
collective solidarity, or if they are unsure who might benefit from their tax pay-
ments. Alternatively, they may be more likely to accept a heavy burden of sacrifice
if they believe that their taxes go to benefit their in-group. Lieberman explains how
10 In contrast to much recent economic scholarship on taxation in multiethnic states (e.g., Alesina and
Glaeser 2006), Lieberman takes ethnic boundaries to require explanation rather than taking them
as historical givens.
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historical racial conflict in South Africa increased tax compliance among whites,
and enabled the development of comparatively high tax rates and an efficient and
effective tax administration at an early and critical stage in the development of
South Africa’s tax system when white taxpayers believed that their taxes benefited
other white citizens. By contrast, in Brazil, the historical absence of comparably
rigid racial boundaries contributed to the development of less productive tax poli-
cies and weaker tax administration because taxpayers were less concerned about
benefiting those of their own race. In-groups simply didn’t exist in the same sense,
and taxpayers therefore did not think in terms of benefits for their in-group. A
contrary set of path-dependent processes unfolded in the realm of AIDS policy in
those two countries. Lieberman’s argument brings a sociological question into the
heart of the cost-benefit calculation by asking who the relevant unit is for whom
costs and benefits are being weighed. Lieberman points out that social boundaries
are themselves historical creations; his argument implies that the consideration of
history is unavoidable if we wish to explain why taxpayers consent.
In the following chapter (Chapter 7), Eisaku Ide and Sven Steinmo argue for
the importance of another social factor in generating taxpayer consent: the social
norm of trust in political elites. Their empirical case is well chosen to illustrate
the potentially dire consequences when taxpayers do not consent to be taxed.
Japan’s remarkable turnaround from a model of fiscal discipline to a model of
runaway deficits is a cautionary tale for current policy makers, and a major puzzle
for contemporary tax scholarship. Ide and Steinmo argue that one factor that
undermined citizens’ willingness to pay taxes was their sense that the government
could not be trusted to handle the revenue responsibly. And this mistrust, they
argue, was borne of prior tax-policy choices. Having squandered the trust of citizens
by embracing neoliberal fiscal policies and by repeatedly displaying preferential
treatment toward the richest taxpayers, Japanese political elites lost the ability
to demand sacrifices from common citizens. Their argument implies that the
study of taxpayer consent must have a historical dimension, because consent at
any given time is a response to prior policies, which themselves represented an
accommodation with taxpayers’ prior willingness to sacrifice. Moreover, their case
study points out that taxpayer consent may be withdrawn in modern societies.
If taxpayer consent was primarily a function of coercion or manipulation, as the
elite theorists argued, these patterns would be hard to explain. Rather, this case
suggests that taxpayers who object to the terms of the social contract, or who
are dissatisfied with the inability of state actors to perform their civic obligations,
are perfectly willing and able to withdraw their consent.
The new fiscal sociology suggests that social identities and norms affect whether
citizens will acquiesce in a tax policy. Acceptance, however, is not necessarily
compliance. Indeed, even during wartime taxpayer consent may be contested and
ambiguous (Bank, Stark, and Thorndike 2008). In Chapter 8, Naomi Feldman
and Joel Slemrod apply insights about social identities and norms to wartime tax
compliance: When called upon to share in wartime sacrifice, will people pay or will
they evade? Feldman and Slemrod test the conventional wisdom that taxpayers’
sense of identification with their polity and their willingness to sacrifice should
be greatest during wartime with data on war and attitudes toward tax compliance
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in more than sixty countries since 1970. They find that people in states that have
recently undergone wars do report slightly more support for tax compliance, but
that war fatalities erode support for tax compliance. Their results suggest that, at
least for the post-1970 period, war may indeed affect compliance attitudes, but
that this effect is small and may be conditional on the destructiveness of the war.
And in contrast to the assumptions of many previous studies (e.g., Rasler and
Thompson 1985; Kiser and Linton 2001), their findings suggest that the more
limited the war, as measured by fatalities, the greater the support for paying taxes.
Feldman and Slemrod’s work sheds new light on the “ratchet effect” that tax
scholars have identified, in which tax revenue increases during wartime and never
entirely returns to prewar levels.
Finally, in Chapter 9 Robin L. Einhorn presents a forceful argument for the thesis
that taxpayer consent is cultivated by democracy and liberty. Einhorn asks why
the Northern colonies developed more sophisticated tax bureaucracies than the
Southern ones in pre-Revolutionary America. This deceptively modest question
ends up turning well-established interpretations of American history upside down.
Historians who focus on the rhetoric of the period argue that the South was more
“democratic” than the North and therefore conclude that democracy was born
out of slavery – that, in an echo of Lieberman’s argument earlier, the presence
of sharp social boundaries between groups functioned to increase within-group
solidarity. Einhorn argues that this interpretation of American history mistakes
the rhetoric of democracy for the real thing. She shows that in practice, Southern
colonies were much less democratic in their governing procedures – and that
the absence of democracy and liberty had far-reaching consequences for state
capacity. The colonies of the South, despite their integration into world markets,
showed little capacity to engage in tax assessment, because slave owners resisted
any democratic inquiry into their affairs. By contrast, in Northern colonies where
slavery was less prevalent and local democracy more robust, a political tradition of
self-governance fostered more sophisticated tax structures and tax administration.
Einhorn concludes, “The legitimacy of taxation does not depend on quantitative
precision. It depends on the political flexibility that allows taxpayers to think they
are being treated fairly.” Taxpayer consent, in short, depends on democracy and
liberty.
All of these chapters illustrate that consent is rarely secured with coercion alone.
Where elite theory treated tax compliance as evidence that taxpayers were duped
or coerced, the work of all of these contributors echoes Levi’s argument that there
is a voluntary element in the payment of taxes. For instance, the implication of
Lieberman’s work is that white taxpayers consented to being taxed in South Africa
because they believed that it would benefit other whites – not only because they
were coerced or duped into payment – and that coercion and manipulation were
not enough to generate taxpayer compliance in Brazil in the absence of taxpayer
consent. Ide and Steinmo’s work points to the ability of taxpayers to withdraw
their consent if they are not satisfied with the conditions of the social contract
when state actors abdicate their obligations of fiscal citizenship, when they fail
to live up to the trust and confidence bestowed upon lawmakers by citizens.
Feldman and Slemrod’s work is part of a tradition that asks whether a sense of
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duty is part of taxpayer consent. By examining the links between war and taxpayer
compliance, they show how the duration of conflicts, as measured by fatalities,
can erode citizens’ confidence in the state, and hence their consent to pay taxes.
Einhorn’s work also implies that taxpayer consent depends on taxpayers’ sense
that the methods of tax collection are just, which is a function of their liberty and
ability to participate in the deliberations of government.
All of these chapters also stress that taxpayer consent – including both political
acceptance and compliance with the law – depends on a social rather than an indi-
vidual contract. Taxpayers think about the collective good. And their calculations
are affected by characteristics of the society as a whole. If you want to understand
consent to taxation, it is not enough to ask about individual costs or benefits. It is
also necessary to ask questions like these: Is the society as a whole ethnically divided
or united? Is it at war or at peace? Trusting or untrusting? Democratic or undemo-
cratic? Slave or free? In short, our contributors suggest that taxation in democratic
states is not primarily predation; it is the embodiment of a social contract.
Part III. The Social Consequences of Taxation
Militarist theory demonstrated that taxation shaped state capacity to wage war;
our contributors extend fiscal sociology in new directions by exploring the conse-
quences of taxation for other social and cultural outcomes. Of course, the inves-
tigation of the economic consequences of taxation itself is not new or distinctive.
Public finance economists have long been preoccupied with measuring the inci-
dence of taxes and how they “distort” economic decision-making. What is different
about the new fiscal sociology is its focus on broader social, political, and insti-
tutional outcomes, such as family structure, state capacity, or ideals of justice.
Even when our contributors turn their attention to inequality – a classic subject
of the economics of taxation – they tend to take a sociological approach, reviving
the Tocquevillian hypothesis that tax policy may not only affect the gradational
distribution of income and wealth, but may also create and reinforce categorical
social distinctions.11
The frontiers of research on social and cultural consequences of taxation are
wide open. Recent research points in a wide variety of directions. Tax policy may
shape the life course by shaping possibilities for marriage (McCaffery, Chapter 13),
or pensions for retirement (Scott 2007; Zelinsky 2007). Tax policy affects the orga-
nization of health care markets (Hacker 2002), and may thereby have important
consequences for public health. Social movement scholars have hypothesized that
tax exemptions for not-for-profit corporations are an important factor channeling
protest into particular organizational forms (McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991).
American historians have noted how Southern segregationists during the late 1960s
attempted to use tax exemptions and tax benefits for charitable contributions to cre-
ate private “segregation academies” (Crespino 2007: 228). Comparative scholars of
11 In Tocqueville’s words: “Of all the various ways of making men [sic] conscious of their differences and
of stressing class distinctions unequal taxation is the most pernicious, since it creates a permanent
estrangement between those who benefit and those who suffer by it” ([1856] 1955: 88).
P1: JZP Trim: 6in × 9in Top: 0.375in Gutter: 0.875in
CUUS610-01 cuus610/Martin ISBN: 978 0 521 73839 2 March 26, 2009 15:41
The Thunder of History 23
religion have pointed out that tax discrimination has been a crucial device for either
restricting or encouraging the creation of religious institutions independent of the
state – and they have hypothesized that tax policy may thereby affect the vitality of
religion, in all its varied forms from collective worship to private belief (see Finke
and Iannaccone 1993). Art historians and sociologists have argued that tax policies
affect the possibilities for careers in artistic production, and have hypothesized that
tax policy choices may even affect the content of art – for example, a tax that affects
the international trade in artworks selectively may thereby channel patronage
toward particular artistic styles in particular periods (Becker 1982: 172). Historical
studies of American suburbs have shown how federal tax policy literally has shaped
the physical landscape, for instance, facilitating the post-WWII expansion of sub-
urban shopping centers (Hanchett 1996). Scholars of economic development cite
a state’s failure to implement a social contract of taxation as one of the key rea-
sons for underdevelopment (Kohli 2004: 8; Moore, 2004). And the ability to raise
revenue through taxation underpins a state’s ability to borrow at low interest on
credit markets (Bra¨utigam, Fjeldstad, and Moore 2008), foreshadowing long-term
consequences for the American state’s recent commitment to tax reduction.
It is not surprising that scholars in so many disparate fields have noticed the
potential relevance of taxation. As we argued earlier, taxation is central to moder-
nity. The very centrality of taxation suggests that it will put its stamp on many
elements of modern social life: in tax policy, the state codifies central cultural
categories of a society and imbues them with the force of law and the power of
economic incentives.
In Part III, our contributors pursue several new directions in the social and
cultural impact of taxation. Charles Tilly’s magisterial contribution sums up the
case for seeing democracy itself as one of the consequences of taxation. In so doing,
Tilly is reaching back to Tocqueville while showing us the future of fiscal sociology.
The import of Tocqueville’s argument about the French Revolution was not only
that tax policy may create invidious social distinctions, but that tax policy may
also create and reproduce the very category of political citizenship – the social
boundary between those who are full political citizens and those who are not.
Tilly’s contribution to this book pursues this insight with a sweeping historical
argument that state extraction of resources from society (of which taxation is a
special case) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratization. States
that acquire their resources by production in state enterprises or sale of natural
resources do not need to secure the active consent of their subjects. Yet states
that acquire their resources by directly extracting resources from their subjects
do. This type of direct extraction initiates a cycle of resistance, repression, and
bargaining that may ultimately result in the creation of an institutionalized forum
for negotiation between the state and its citizenry – the first step on the road
toward full-fledged democracy. Taxpayer consent, for Tilly, is the contemporary
manifestation of a grand historical bargain, and comes only with an extension of
political powers to taxpayers.
In Chapter 11, Edgar Kiser and Audrey Sacks investigate the consequences
of forms of tax collection for state capacity. This is one of the most promising
areas of the new fiscal sociology (see Lieberman 2002a), and surely one of the
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most urgent. States that are unable to raise revenues may be unable to provide
the most basic conditions for peace and prosperity. Kiser and Sacks show that
bureaucratic tax administration in many states of sub-Saharan Africa are a poor fit
for economies where the scarcity of resources and poor means of transportation and
communication make it difficult for states to monitor and sanction tax collectors.
Kiser and Sacks attribute the uncritical adoption of bureaucratic forms of tax
administration to normative pressures for the adoption of the most “modern”
tax administration.12 They proceed to argue that under specifiable conditions,
developing countries in the twenty-first century may actually benefit from tax-
farming arrangements similar to those that served some rulers well in early modern
Europe.
In Chapter 12, Beverly Moran asks what tax system would best realize the
ideals that Adam Smith identified several centuries ago. She argues that Smith’s
ideals were crafted in response to the tax policies that were possible in his time –
and that applying his first principles in a different context, we should therefore
draw very different conclusions about what policy Smith would recommend. In
making this argument about how tax policy may shape tax ideals, she too makes
a normative prescription: that a tax structure dependent on wealth taxes would
be more equitable in America than the current income-tax-driven tax structure.
Inheritance laws ensure that past historical oppressions continue to contribute to
the contemporary inequities in the distribution of wealth. Taxing wealth would
therefore realize a substantive conception of equality and of justice.
Edward McCaffery’s chapter presents new comparative data on the consequences
of tax policy for the intimate sphere of the family. His chapter builds on work by
many legal scholars that has shown how tax laws may help reproduce gender
inequalities, and may contribute to political conflicts between dual-income cou-
ples and single-earner couples (Blumberg 1971; Jones 1988; Staudt 1996; Brown
and Fellows 1996; McCaffery 1997; Alstott 2001).13 McCaffery argues that several
features of U.S. tax law favor unmarried couples or “traditional,” single-earner
families over dual-income, married couples with children. He documents that
this bias was deliberately written into the law at a critical juncture after World
War II. And he argues that once in place, this structural bias reproduced itself –
and ensured ongoing conflict between “traditional,” single-earner families that are
advantaged under the law, and two-earner families that are not.
The final chapter written by W. Elliot Brownlee sounds a cautionary note.
Although tax policy may affect society in many ways, it does not mean that
tax experts are free to manipulate society as they wish. As Brownlee’s chapter
demonstrates, post-WWII Japan seemed to present a perfect laboratory for testing
policy prescriptions that were designed to achieve goals of equity and economic
12 Some of the modernization theorists explicitly warned that this might occur, cautioning experts
against the risks of promoting “modern” tax policies in societies where the ambient economy would
make them impossible to administer fairly (Ardant 1965; Musgrave 1969). Their theories generally
implied, however, that such mismatched tax policies would result in negative feedback processes –
chiefly tax resistance and evasion – that would tend to steer tax policies toward conformity with the
capacities of the ambient economy.
13 For an introduction to the Critical Tax Law literature, see Infanti and Crawford (2009).
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growth. In the aftermath of the war, the U.S. government invited a group of
American tax experts, led by economist Carl S. Shoup, to redesign Japan’s tax
system from the ground up. If ever social science had a hand in shaping the
world, it should have done so here: These reforms were imposed by a victorious
power on an unambiguously defeated rival; they followed a war that had made
unprecedented fiscal demands and led to perhaps the most dramatic tax policy
changes in history; the defeat had been a crisis of catastrophic proportions for the
Japanese state; and Shoup and his team of economists were unusually prepared
with analysis and prescription. Yet, Brownlee shows that the Shoup reforms did not
endure. Although the occupation did force the Japanese government to adopt the
reforms, business and other interest groups persuaded a subsequent government
to roll them back. All the hard work of Shoup and his economists was unraveled.
This case thus presents clear evidence that the exogenous shock of military defeat
is not sufficient to remake a tax system wholesale. Tax policy writers may shape
society – but not always as they wish nor under conditions of their choosing.
As the chapters in Part III illustrate, the study of the social and cultural conse-
quences of taxation opens up new normative questions for social theory and the
policy sciences. The traditional concern of “optimal taxation theory” with effi-
ciency and vertical equity does not exhaust the goods that tax policy may secure.
The tax policy that is optimal for economic growth or to maintain progressivity
may not be optimal for military success, social solidarity, or democracy. As Beverly
Moran points out, these concerns of the new fiscal sociology are in many respects
a return to the broader normative concerns of the founders of public finance.
In concentrating on the consequences of taxation, this strand of the new fiscal
sociology thus showcases a normative impulse that is increasingly present in the
social sciences: the attempt to marshal the insights of historical work to the explicit
aim of improving public policy. In imitation of the normative prescriptions of
economics, but in disagreement with some of the assumptions and methods that
characterize that field, many scholars wish to explore the potential of a historically
oriented social science to contribute to public debates.14 This approach has also met
with fierce criticism and resistance. Critics worry that a preoccupation with current
political relevance could obscure the attempt to understand social phenomena on
their own terms, and could damage the ability of the social sciences to serve
as sites where partisan debates may be transcended (see Monroe 2005, for the
debates in political science; Clawson et al. 2007, for the debates in sociology; and
Novick 1988 for the long-standing debates in history, particularly with regards to
public history). The contributors to this section of the book present all points of
the spectrum on that debate: Kiser and Sacks, and Moran draw out normative
prescriptions explicitly, while McCaffery implicitly advocates gender-neutral tax
policy. Brownlee, on the other hand, implies that experts who wish to influence
policy have to reckon with obdurate political realities.
14 This wish for real-world relevance has been so strong in political science, history, and sociology that
it has led in recent years to the founding of new flagship journals devoted to the publication and
dissemination of research that speaks to pressing public issues (e.g., Perspectives on Politics, Journal
of Policy History, and Contexts).
P1: JZP Trim: 6in × 9in Top: 0.375in Gutter: 0.875in
CUUS610-01 cuus610/Martin ISBN: 978 0 521 73839 2 March 26, 2009 15:41
26 Isaac WilliamMartin, Ajay K. Mehrotra, and Monica Prasad
Together, the chapters in this book illustrate the ambition of the new fiscal soci-
ology. Mainstream economics has taught us a great deal about how taxation affects
relationships between buyers and sellers – and thereby affects economic growth
and the distribution of income. The new fiscal sociology aims to shed light on
how taxation affects nonmarket relationships, including kin relationships, sym-
bolic relationships between in-groups and out-groups, and political relationships
between rulers and ruled. And the new fiscal sociology asks us to both undertake
historical research that is engaged in the important debates of the day, and cautions
us against the belief that scholars alone can remake the world.
THE FUTURE OF THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY
Fiscal sociology is growing rapidly and it will continue to do so. Consider, as a point
of comparison, the political sociology of public spending on welfare. This field was
small in 1975. Today it supports a large, growing, and lively interdisciplinary
research community, and rightly so – social spending is a big deal. Scholars of
social policy routinely explain the interest and importance of their subject by
pointing out that spending money on social provision is “the principal domestic
undertaking of states in the West” (Orloff 2005: 190), comprising a greater share
of economic activity in the affluent countries than anything else that government
does. Yet this claim is only true if one ignores the revenue side of the budget.
If we follow the convention of welfare state research and measure the size of an
activity by the sheer volume of cash transferred between state and society, then
the principal domestic undertaking of states in the west is not spending money on
social provision or on anything else. It is collecting taxes.15 Outside of the most
developed welfare states, the imbalance is even more striking. Taxation is one of the
main things that most states do. The puzzle is that so many sociologists, historians,
legal scholars, and political scientists have neglected it for this long.
Scholars will continue to study tax policy as an index of social, political, and
economic change. But the future of fiscal sociology points beyond the study of
taxation as an index or symptom of other changes, and toward an understanding of
taxation as the central element in the social, political, and economic development
of the modern world: the actually existing social contract, the renegotiation of
which transforms the relationship between state and society.
Schumpeter’s high hopes for fiscal sociology reflected his conviction that tax
policy enjoyed a special theoretical status, because tax policy more than any other
15 We focus here on all taxation, not just taxation earmarked or intended for social spending, because
taxation as a social activity of states has a great deal in common regardless of its intended or imputed
purpose – and because taxation as such has formal and sociological similarities to government social
spending. Both social transfers and taxes are legally obligatory, unremunerated economic transfers
across the state-society boundary; indeed, from a certain point of view, social transfers are simply
negative taxes. Yet they are dwarfed by positive taxes. In 2001, direct public spending on social
provision in fifteen affluent European countries averaged 23 percent of Gross Domestic Product,
or GDP. Tax revenues averaged 40 percent of GDP; taxes on income plus taxes on sales together
account for a greater proportion of GDP than social spending. These statistics are from (OECD
(2007). They represent the countries that the OECD calls the “EU 15.”
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policy might shape the direction of social change. It might even be one of the great
motor forces of history. For this reason, the study of public budgets was not just a
specialized subfield of policy history; it was the key to the whole. In his essay on
the tax state, Schumpeter did not shy away from the strongest version of this claim:
In some historical periods the immediate formative influence of the fiscal needs
and policy of the state on the development of the economy and with it on all
forms of life and all aspects of culture explains practically all the major features
of events; in most periods it explains a great deal and there are but a few periods
when it explains nothing. ([1918] 1991: 100)
Schumpeter was surely overreaching, but how far was he overreaching? We will
not know until scholars have explored the limits of what can be explained by
fiscal policy. Tax policy does not explain everything that social scientists and
historians are interested in. But we suspect that tax policy has shaped more of the
theoretically important facts about social life and social change than scholars have
guessed hitherto.
P1: JZP Trim: 6in × 9in Top: 0.375in Gutter: 0.875in
CUUS610-01 cuus610/Martin ISBN: 978 0 521 73839 2 March 26, 2009 15:41
28
